Settles at $0 or $1 · on a known date
Keep the position. Draw against it
- Chain Polygon
- pUSD 1:1 USDC.e
- Max LTV 50%
- Liquidation 70%
- Early close 7d
- Audit none yet
Right for months.
Paid on one day
Resolution can be a weekend away or five months away. Whichever it is, the position pays on that day and not before, and the value is quoted the whole way there.
Selling is the only way to reach it, and selling ends the position. You trade the outcome you called for the money it has not made yet.
Eight steps, and none of them is selling
You already hold the bet: an outcome token, trading at 70¢, resolving on a known date. On Polymarket it is money that cannot move until then.
Deployed
Not deployed yet
The one idea
Not how healthy. How far it can fall
A prediction-market position ends at exactly $0 or $1, so the distance to liquidation and the distance to worthless are the same axis. Lending protocols report a health factor because their collateral has no ceiling and no settlement point. Here the whole risk model fits on one line, drawn in the cents you were already thinking in.
At full width, a hundred cells — one per cent. The wall is where the loan breaks, the run of equals is what the price can still give up, and the block is the market right now. Open a loan below and move the price to watch that run get shorter.
Worth asking
The awkward ones
Every answer here is enforced by the code, or it says plainly that it is not.
Read the contractsWhat happens when my market resolves?
The position redeems for $1 or $0. If it wins, the redemption repays the loan and the surplus returns to you. If it loses, the collateral is worth nothing and the shortfall is written off against lenders — which is why the loan is capped at half the position's value.
What if it resolves while my loan is still open?
`settleResolved(loanId)` redeems the position and repays the debt from the proceeds. Without it a resolved market would leave the collateral frozen in the contract with nothing left to price it against.
Can I be liquidated by a price glitch?
New loans are sized off the lower of the best bid and the hourly average, so a momentary spike cannot inflate one. A genuine fall applies immediately. Smoothing a real collapse would only delay the liquidation that answers it.
Who runs the price feed?
The protocol does. It is a push oracle: the backend publishes min(best bid, 1h TWAP) on a heartbeat, and early when the price moves. The oracle updater and the liquidator are deliberately separate keys, and liquidation pays its caller nothing — whoever can write a price must not profit by acting on it. That removal of motive, plus timelocked treasury withdrawals, is what stands behind a feed the protocol itself operates.
Who runs liquidations?
The protocol, for now. Seized collateral goes to the reserve rather than to the caller, so there is no profit in liquidating against a price the protocol itself published.
What happens to my collateral after a liquidation?
It stops being a bet. Seized positions go to a treasury contract that exposes a permissionless complement swap: anyone delivers the opposite outcome, the pair is merged back into pUSD at the CTF's fixed $1, and the deliverer is paid for it.
Can a market stop being accepted as collateral?
Yes, through the adapter's liquidity flag, and only its owner can move it. The backend deliberately holds no key for it — it can block a market in the API and page an operator, but it cannot change what the pool will accept. Two of the risk checks in the spec, minimum volume and resolution risk, are not on-chain data and can only advise.
Can I withdraw at any time?
Whenever the pool holds free liquidity. Funds currently lent out are not withdrawable until they are repaid, which is the trade for the yield.
Has this been audited?
No. The contracts are readable above and the parameters are published in full, and neither of those is an audit. Conservative LTV and the early-close ramp reduce the risk of a loss; they do not remove it.